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Executive Summary
Concern over information security breaches has led to the recent publication of “guidance”
concerning security breaches by data protection commissioners in the United Kingdom, Canada, New
Zealand, and, most recently, Australia. A key focus of all of these documents is the notice that
institutions must provide to individuals whose data are involved in information security breaches.
At the same time, the European Union has already begun the process of considering a draft
directive governing electronic communications services that contains provisions governing security
breaches, including a security breach notification requirement. National and multinational data
protection officials have called for expanding the notice provisions to apply to information security
breaches in other economic sectors.
All of these documents build on—in some cases explicitly—the experience of the United
States. Beginning with California in 2002, 43 states and the District of Columbia have adopted
legislation requiring that institutions suffering breaches of personal information must notify the
individuals whose data are involved.
The recent proposals from the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia reflect
many of the practical lessons from the broad and diverse U.S. experience about the advantages and
limits of notices. Some aspects of these proposals, however, as well as the pending EU directive and
the responses of European data protection commissioners, suggest that important insights from the
U.S. experience are being overlooked. They thus risk repeating mistakes made by their U.S.
counterparts. Those include:
1. Defining “security breach” so broadly that it makes the term, and the notices it prompts,
less meaningful. The recent government guides define “security breaches” to include the loss
or theft of devices (e.g., laptops or external drives) and storage media (e.g., disks or USB
drives) that happen to contain personal data, even in the absence of any evidence that the data
have been accessed. Breaches are also defined to include misdirected or undelivered faxes,
emails, and parcels, or other errors involving responsible parties who have no interest in
accessing or misusing the data.
2. Focusing too much on notices to address security breaches. Notices are always a second
best tool because they only respond to breaches, not prevent them. Moreover, they shift the
burden from the responsible parties to the innocent data subject. The preoccupation with
notices is even more problematic when they are required when there is no risk to individuals
or nothing individuals can do to guard against that risk.
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3. Justifying notices as a response to identity fraud. Identity fraud is declining, despite
information security breaches, and recent studies suggest that breaches play little role in
facilitating fraud. The U.S. Government Accountability Office reported in summer 2007 that
in only one of the 24 largest breaches publicly reported in the United States between January
2000 and June 2005 was there evidence of true identity theft. In 2008, researchers at Carnegie
Mellon University, using data from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, found “no
statistically significant effect that [breach notice] laws reduce identity theft.”
4. Ignoring the limits of notices and the negative consequences of their inappropriate use.
Notices seem inadequate to the task of empowering consumers to protect themselves since
notices are widely ignored and rarely acted on even if received. The requirement for notices in
situations in which they are not realistically likely to prevent or mitigate harm threatens to
exacerbate the existing tendency of recipients to ignore those notices. Similarly, the
inappropriate use of notices is likely to misfocus the public and industry on security breaches,
and divert scarce resources away from dealing with more pressing security threats. This is
especially true of notice requirements that punish industry through public exposure for
inevitable and often harmless security breaches. Put simply, if we think real risks are posed by
security breaches, the notice response is too timid. If not, the notice response is too great.
5. Applying a twentiethcentury response to a twentyfirstcentury problem. Breach
notices—like privacy notices—were designed for a world in which data processing was
infrequent, highly centralized, and clearly structured. Today, the collection and use of personal
data are ubiquitous. And demand for personal data from business, the government, and other
organizations is escalating. In this dataintensive, complex, and global world, widescale
reliance on breach notices and privacy notices is increasingly outdated. If individuals must be
notified every time personal data or the media on which they are stored cannot be accounted
for, the public and the environment will succumb under the deluge of notices and individuals
will rapidly learn to ignore them completely. Notices are too slow, too cumbersome, and too
poorly timed to provide meaningful protection for information security, and requiring them as
a broad response to security threats promises to inundate individuals with notices that they are
illequipped and unlikely to act on. The proliferation of digital data, global commerce and data
flows, and serious security threats challenges the old ways of thinking. Linking privacy and
security protection to notices is illsuited as a broad response to the realities of the global
flows of digital information or of the sustained threats to that information in the twentyfirst
century.

2

Introduction
In recent months, concern over information security breaches has led data protection
commissioners in the United Kingdom, 1 Canada,2 New Zealand3 and, most recently, Australia4 to
publish “guidance” concerning security breaches. While currently nonbinding, these frameworks
originate from regulators who exercise considerable authority over datahandling practices, and they
are likely to serve as roadmaps for future legislation. In fact, the governments of Canada and the
United Kingdom have already begun the process of introducing laws modeled on their prior advice. A
key focus of all these documents is notice that institutions must provide to individuals whose data are
involved in information security breaches.
The European Union has gone further to begin considering a draft directive governing
electronic communications services that contains rigorous provisions governing security breaches,
including a security breach notification requirement.5 National and multinational data protection
officials have called for expanding the notice provisions to apply to information security breaches in
other economic sectors.6
All these documents build on—in some cases explicitly—the experience of the United States.
Beginning with California in 2002, 43 states and the District of Columbia have adopted security
breach legislation. 7 In addition, in 2005 U.S. federal regulators issued final interagency guidance for
federally regulated financial institutions and their duty to disclose breaches.8 These laws all have in
common the requirement that institutions suffering breaches of personal information must notify the
individuals whose data are involved. Beyond this core point, the U.S. laws differ as to whom they
apply, how they define personal information (only a few states include medical and biometric
information), what triggers notification (ranging from unauthorized access to data to reasonable
possibility of harmful use of data), whether encrypting the data will exempt them from notification
requirements, who must be notified (some require notification of specified state authorities), the
timing of notification, the content of the notification, and the penalties for noncompliance (with many
providing for statutory damages between $500 and $1,000 per person whose data is compromised, and
some providing for trebling of damages for willful noncompliance).
The recent proposals from the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia reflect
many of the practical lessons from the broad and diverse U.S. experience about the advantages and
limits of notices. Some aspects of these proposals, however, as well as the pending EU directive and
the responses of European data protection commissioners, suggest that some important insights from
the U.S. experience are being overlooked. They thus risk repeating mistakes made by their U.S.
counterparts. The risk, as the U.S. experience suggests, is that poorly targeted breach notice
requirements misfocus the resources available to enhance information security, diminish the
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effectiveness of notices by inundating individuals with inappropriate notices, and contribute to
industry practices and public policies that fail to address the most important security risks today or
those most likely to pose the greatest threat tomorrow.
This white paper highlights five key sets of lessons from the U.S. and other nations’
experiences with breach notices in light of recent initiatives to expand use of breach notices around the
world.

1. Understanding Security Breaches
Information security is important; security breaches may or may not be, depending on what is
included within the term “security breach.” Most breach laws define “security breach” to include
unauthorized access to defined categories of personal information (in the United States, usually
information used to create or access financial accounts). The Australian consultation paper, for
example, defines a breach as occurring when “personal information is exposed to unauthorized access,
use, disclosure or modification.”9
There are two problems with this definition. The first is that personal information is stored on
devices (e.g., laptops or external drives) and storage media (e.g., disks or USB drives) that are often
lost or stolen. U.S. regulators have tended to treat such data as having been “accessed,” even in the
absence of any evidence that they have been. The second problem is that personal data are routinely
“disclosed” through misdirected faxes, emails, and parcels, or other errors involving responsible
parties who have no interest in accessing or misusing the data. Again, U.S. regulators tend to treat
these everyday events as involving unauthorized access to those data. Given that European data
protection laws generally define personal data more broadly than their U.S. counterparts, especially in
the business setting, an even wider range of misdirected communications might be expected to be
regarded as security “breaches.” By not addressing whether personal data have actually been accessed,
and, if so, by whom and in what context, the broad definition of “security breach” lumps together
deliberate theft of data with the theft or loss of equipment or media containing data, or the accidental
receipt of personal data.
Many of the largest “breaches” reported to date turn out not to involve access to data at all.
For example, the May 2005 theft from a Department of Veterans Affairs’ employee’s home of the
laptop containing Social Security numbers and birthdates for 26.5 million veterans and activeduty
military personnel constitutes the largest public sector data breach in the United States. It triggered
months of press attention, led to the notification of all 26.5 million individuals and the firing or
disciplining of numerous employees, and it cost the government millions of dollars. But when the
laptop was recovered two months later, the FBI reported that the data had never been accessed. The
thieves had stolen the laptop for the laptop, not for the data it contained.10
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Similarly, that same month a box containing four backup tapes of data about millions of
CitiFinancial customers disappeared while being shipped via United Parcel Service. At the time, the
loss of the box was heralded by the press as the United States’ largest privatesector security breach,
and CitiFinancial provided notice and credit monitoring services to every individual with data on one
of the four missing tapes. The tapes have never been recovered. There has been no higher than normal
incident of identity theft involving the individuals whose data was on the tapes. In fact, there is no
evidence that any of the data on them was every accessed by anyone. Rather, the box containing them
is just another of the thousands of packages lost each year while in transit. Because the tapes contained
personal data, the loss of the box in which they were being shipped constitutes a “breach” under U.S.
law. The misdelivery of mail, faxes, and email similarly have been regarded as breaches, even in the
absence of evidence that the personal data they contain was accessed by anyone.
Most of the more recent breach guides highlight the breadth of the definition. For example, the
U.K. Information Commissioner’s Office notes that a breach can result from “loss or theft of data or
equipment on which data is stored,” “equipment failure,” “human error,” or even “unforeseen
circumstances such as a fire or flood.”11 Such a sweeping scope necessarily means that the guidance or
rules that follow will apply not only when information has been accessed without authorization, but
also in circumstances in which the data merely could have been accessed, even if there is no evidence
that they have been, and experience and professional judgment suggests that they have not been. This
breadth poses real challenges for regulators about how to write and enforce rules for mere
potentialities, as opposed to actual occurrences. As discussed in greater detail below, it also poses
challenges for businesses and other institutions holding personal data.
The recent guides from the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia
demonstrate sensitivity to the challenges posed by such a broad definition of data breach by
recognizing that notification is not appropriate in response to all breaches. In the words of the U.K.
guidance, “informing people about a breach is not an end in itself.”12 Instead, each of the guides
provides factors that should be considered when determining whether notification is appropriate.
Several of the guides include language suggesting that in situations in which data are lost, are
stored on equipment that is lost or stolen, or are sent to a responsible but unauthorized party by
accident—where there is no evidence that the data themselves have been accessed—notification might
be inappropriate. The New Zealand information paper suggests that where “an address database may
in error be sent out of a company to a trusted mail house used by the company” and “the error may be
quickly discovered and the database be retrieved safely,” there may be “little point in notification.”13
The Australia consultation paper stresses that notification is necessary only when “an information
security breach creates a real risk of serious harm to the individual.”14 The Canadian guide suggests
that one factor to be considered when determining whether to notify is whether the disclosure was to
an “unknown party or to a party suspected of being involved in criminal activity.”15
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This qualitative analysis of the risk of harm to the individual stands in stark and welcome
contrast to most U.S. laws, which typically require notification on a strict liability basis.
Unfortunately, it also contrasts with the approach recommended by data protection officials in the
European Union, which follows the U.S. model in requiring “mandatory notification.” The European
Data Protection Supervisor issued an opinion on the pending ePrivacy directive in which he
recommended that “the ePrivacy Directive and particularly Article 4 [concerning security breaches]
should not contain any exception to the obligation to notify.”16 This is even broader than the U.S.
approach, which generally provides an exception for notification if data are encrypted.

2. The Role of Notices
Breach notices are justified on several grounds. The most common is to “enable individuals to
take steps to protect themselves from any harmful effects” of the breach, most commonly thought to
be identity or financial fraud.17 Other justifications include to increase “accountability” of
organizations that suffer breaches, raise “awareness among the public,”18 and “allow the appropriate
regulatory bodies to perform their functions, provide advice and deal with complaints.”19 As a
practical matter, only the first justification, which is discussed in greater detail below, should require
notification directly to the individuals whose data were involved in the breach. The others may require
more public disclosure or notice to applicable regulators.
The United Kingdom, Canadian, New Zealand, and Australian documents all note the
importance of having a “clear purpose” for notification and only using notice when it serves that
purpose. 20 Even when notices have a clear purpose, however, it is important to recognize how limited
their role may be in the overall context of data security. For example, notice is always a response to an
event after it has occurred, rather than the prevention of that event. Moreover, where sensitive personal
information is involved, notice is almost always an inadequate response. Not even the best notice can
restore confidentiality to data that have been disclosed, and while some personal data may be capable
of being changed (e.g., credit card numbers or account numbers), most are not.
Notice is also problematic because it shifts—or gives the appearance of shifting—the burden
from the organization possessing the data to the individuals whose data were breached. This is
especially problematic if the breach does not pose a reasonable risk of harm to the individual or if
there is nothing that the individual can do to mitigate that harm.
The United Kingdom, Canadian, New Zealand, and Australian documents demonstrate an
acute awareness of the limited role and function of notices. The Australian consultation paper, for
example, places notices within a broader context of the need to keep personal information secure and
the tools (in some cases, legally required) for doing so. The paper addresses “risk assessment, policy
development, staff training, technology, monitor[ing] and review[ing], standards, and privacy impact
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assessments and audits,” before ever getting to information security breaches.21 The New Zealand
information paper notes that the best way to prevent breaches is to have a “well thought out and
effectively implemented information security plan for all personal information held.”22
This broader context is very important because it not only highlights the importance of
prevention, as well as response, but also helps focus attention on the existence of many possible tools
that address not only security breaches but other potential threats. For example, credit card fraud
existed long before security breaches. Fortunately, efforts to detect and block fraudulent charges and
illicit access to accounts are highly successful. The financial services industry, for example, intercepts
and blocks most fraudulent credit card charges. Moreover, research suggests that only a small
percentage of breached credit card numbers are ever involved in subsequent attempts at fraudulent use.
Visa estimates that fraudulent use is attempted with only 2 percent of compromised credit card
numbers, and the company blocks most of those attempts.23 Other evidence collected in a July 2005
study by Thomas Leonard and Paul Rubin suggests that the percentage of fraudulent use may be
lower.24
The guides also all treat notices as only one of four components of a response to a data breach:
(1) “containment and recovery”; (2) “assessment of ongoing risk”; (3) “notification of breach”; and (4)
“evaluation and response.”25 And even then they limit notices to when notification serves a “clear
purpose”26 and is “necessary in order to avoid or mitigate harm to an individual.”27
This approach differs significantly from that followed in most U.S. states, which have adopted
breach notification laws as standalone measures, divorced from any broader security context and
unconnected to any obligations to attempt to prevent security breaches. Moreover, most state laws
require notification even when there is no risk to the individual or nothing the individual can do to
mitigate that risk.
The other common response to security breaches in the United States—adopted by 47 states
and the District of Columbia—is credit “freeze” laws.28 These laws permit individuals to restrict
access to their credit reports, thereby hopefully diminishing the ability of those who possess breached
personal information to use it to commit identity fraud. Ironically, credit freeze laws are another
example of an incomplete response to breaches: they don’t address the fraudulent use of credit card,
debit card, or account numbers, or other harms resulting from breaches that don’t involve access to a
credit report; they shift the burden of acting to individuals; and they operate without regard to risk of
harm.
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3. The Relationship of Security Breaches to Identity Fraud
The most common justification for breach notices is the need to protect personal information
from use in identity fraud. Identity fraud involves one person impersonating another for the purpose of
obtaining a benefit, for example, opening a credit account or taking out a loan, writing a check, filing a
claim, or otherwise attempting to enrich oneself by claiming to be someone else. Given the breadth of
offenses the term includes, identity fraud (or “identity theft” as it is often called) is a common and
frightening crime, and one that advocates of breach notice laws appear to believe is facilitated by
security breaches. Breach notices are thus seen as an important tool for notifying people whose data
have been involved in a breach to be especially vigilant for signs of identity fraud.
State and federal interest in identity fraud and security breaches in the United States over the
past decade has led to the creation of data about both and about their interrelationship. Two
observations from this research are particularly pertinent.
First, all of the government, industry, and academic studies of identity fraud in the United
States show that the crimes grouped under that name are actually declining. According to a household
telephone survey conducted by Synovate on behalf of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in 2003 and
2006, and four times beginning in 2005 by Javelin Strategy & Research, the frequency of identity
fraud has fallen every year in both real numbers and as a percentage of the U.S. population from a high
of 10.1 million predicted victims in 2003 (4.7 percent) to 8.1 million (3.6 percent) in 2008.29
Moreover, this survey lumps together two distinct forms of identify fraud: “account takeover” (where
the perpetrator makes fraudulent use of an existing account, most commonly through a credit or debit
card transaction) and what researchers label “true identity theft” (where the perpetrator uses personal
information about another individual to open a new account in the victim’s name). Account takeover is
comparatively easy to detect, and under U.S. law, consumers are generally insulated from financial
liability for credit and debit card fraud.30 Although the numbers vary from year to year, account
takeover accounts for between twothird and threefourths of identity fraud incidents; true identity
theft is far less common.
News reports about the political, marketing, and financial motives that may lead some political
and industry leaders to focus so much attention on identity fraud, despite the evidence of its decline,
have appeared in the Associated Press,31 BusinessWeek,32 Money magazine, 33 the New York Times,34
Slate magazine, 35 and other publications.
Second, there is very little evidence of any link between security breaches and identity fraud.
In the 2007 Javelin survey, of the 31 percent of selfreported identity theft victims who knew how
their information was obtained, only 3 percent thought that the source was “possibly related to a
security breach.”36 Even more telling is a 2006 study performed by ID Analytics, operator of the
largest U.S. commercial frauddetection network. ID Analytics analyzed approximately 500,000
accounts and identities involved in four security breaches that occurred in 2003 and 2004. Two of the
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breaches involved identitylevel information (e.g., names and Social Security numbers), which are
typically used to commit true identity theft. Two involved accountlevel information (e.g., account
numbers or passwords), which are more likely to lead to fraudulent use of existing accounts (i.e.,
account takeover).
For the two breaches involving accountlevel data, six and eight months, respectively, after the
breaches, ID Analytics found no increase in the misuse rates for the affected accounts. 37 The same was
true for the breach involving identitylevel information (in this case full consumer name, address,
phone number and Social Security numbers for almost 200,000 individuals) stored on a laptop. Six
months following the theft of the laptop, ID Analytics found a “misuse rate” of 0.0 percent: none of
the data had been used to open new credit card, wireless, or retail credit accounts in the names of the
people affected by the breach. 38
The other breach of identitylevel information that ID Analytics studied involved the
deliberate targeting of data (including name, date of birth and Social Security number for more than
100,000 individuals) by a highly sophisticated fraud ring. Two years after the breach, the misuse rate
was .098 percent; ID Analytics detected an effort to open a fraudulent credit card, wireless, or retail
credit account for one out of every 1,010 people whose data were involved in the breach. This is
slightly lower than the average fraud rate of 1 per every 1,020 accounts that ID Analytics observed for
“nonbreached” data.39
This breach appears to be that suffered by ChoicePoint, but whether it is or not, it is consistent
with ChoicePoint’s experience. In early 2005 ChoicePoint reported that thieves had deliberately
targeted sensitive personal data on 163,000 individuals. The company provided notice to the affected
individuals and settled a Federal Trade Commission suit for allegedly failing to secure data adequately
by paying a $10 million fine and establishing a $5 million restitution fund—the largest settlement in
the Commission’s history.40 In June 2008, the Commission notified ChoicePoint that it had transferred
the balance of the $5 million redress fund to the U.S. Treasury after finding that only 131 consumers
had presented valid claims for a total of $141,753.41 The actual fraud rate was therefore 1 per every
1,244 individuals who had data breached—less than the “ambient” fraud rate in the United States.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office reported in summer 2007 that of the 24 largest
breaches publicly reported in the United States between January 2000 and June 2005, in only three
was there evidence of any resulting misuse of an existing account, and in only one was there any
evidence of true identity theft. 42 These data are supported by the fact that while the number of reported
information security breaches in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan and other
countries has soared over the past five years—to include more than 322 million records as of August
2008—identity fraud appears to have declined by onefifth.43
Identity fraud and security breaches are both certainly important issues, but there is little
evidence connecting the two, especially in the case of true identity theft. As a result, data breach notice
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laws are unlikely to have any effect on the prevalence of fraud, which is precisely what researchers
have found. Using data from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, researchers at Carnegie Mellon
University in 2008 attempted to measure the impact of breach notification laws on identity fraud from
2002 to 2006; they found “no statistically significant effect that [such] laws reduce identity theft.”44
Studies and surveys are backwardfocused, and so may not accurately predict the future
relationship between information security breaches and identity fraud. In addition, it is important to
recognize that virtually all the studies on the link between breaches and identity fraud focus on the
United States. While this is not surprising, given that the United States has the longest experience with
security breach notices, it is important to recognize that there are fundamental differences between
credit markets in the United States and those in most other parts of the world. For example, the United
States has three national credit reporting bureaus, but there is no similar panEuropean system in the
European Union.45 But the available data to date shows little relationship between security breaches
and identity fraud.

4. The Risks of Notices
Breach notices can pose risks to their recipients and to society’s interest in good information
security more broadly. These risks may be divided into three broad categories: risks resulting from the
realities of the notification process, risks resulting from the impact of notices on their recipients, and
risks resulting from the incentives they create for industry and other entities that collect, use, or store
personal data.

a. The Notice Process
We know a great deal about notices and how they work in practice from a variety of contexts,
but the most immediately applicable is the arena of privacy notices. Notice is a fundamental principle
of most data protection standards around the world, including the OECD’s 1980 Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,46 the European Union’s 1995 data
protection directive, 47 APEC’s 2004 Privacy Framework,48 and most of the national and provincial
data protection laws enacted in the past three decades.49 This extensive experience has taught us that
notices are often never received, never read, or never acted upon.
For example, in the United States, according to the U.S. Postal Service, 52 percent of
unsolicited mail is never read.50 Similar figures are reported by companies about the rates at which
their emails are opened by consumers. One of the United States’ largest online service providers
indicated in 2002 that 58 percent of its marketing emails sent to its own customers were never
opened. 51 In 1997, U S WEST (now Qwest Communications), one of the largest telecommunications
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companies in the United States, tested a variety of methods for seeking consent from its customers to
use information about their calling patterns (e.g., volume of calls, time and duration of calls, etc.)—to
market new services to them. 52 Of all the residential customers that U S WEST attempted to contact,
55 percent never received the offer or request for consent, despite multiple attempts.53
Moreover, the available evidence indicates that individuals tend to ignore privacy notices even
when they are made aware of them. The chief privacy officer of Excite@Home told an FTC workshop
on profiling that the day after 60 Minutes featured his company in a segment on internet privacy, only
100 out of 20 million unique visitors to its website accessed that company’s privacy pages. 54
According to an independent research firm’s analysis, an average of 0.3 percent of Yahoo! users read
its privacy policy in 2002. Even at the height of the publicity firestorm created in March 2002 when
Yahoo! changed its privacy policy to permit advertising messages by email, telephone, and mail, that
figure rose only to 1 percent.55 This is by no means limited to privacy notices. It appears to be true of
most mandated disclosures, whether medical informedconsent forms, mortgage disclosure forms, or
license terms on software packages and splash screens.
There is no better example of the failure of notices to alert consumers to the need for action
than the GrammLeachBliley financial privacy notices. Under that U.S. law, by July 1, 2001, the tens
of thousands of financial institutions to which it applies had mailed 2 billion or more notices.56 If ever
consumers would pay attention, this would appear to be the occasion: the notices came in an
avalanche, the press carried a wave of stories about the notices, privacy advocates trumpeted the new
law, and the information at issue—financial information—is among the most sensitive and personal to
most individuals. Yet the consumer response was negligible, and a late September 2001 survey
revealed that 35 percent of the 1,001 respondents could not recall even receiving a privacy notice,
even though the average person had received a dozen or more.57
The lack of consumer attention to GrammLeachBliley notices prompted thenFederal Trade
Commission Chairman Timothy Muris to comment at the end of 2001:
The recent experience with GrammLeachBliley privacy notices should give
everyone pause about whether we know enough to implement effectively broadbased
legislation based on notices. Acres of trees died to produce a blizzard of barely
comprehensible privacy notices. Indeed, this is a statute that only lawyers could
love—until they found out it applied to them. 58
So one of the important risks of breach notices is that because they do not reach the affected
individuals or the individuals fail to read them, the notices do not result in consumers having the
opportunity to take those steps that might mitigate the harm caused by the breach. Notices thus seem
inadequate to the task of empowering consumers to protect themselves when a breach threatens them
with harm.
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b. The Impact on Individuals
A second category of risks is that associated with how individual can—and do—respond to
breaches if they are made aware of the risk. Again, the experience with privacy notices is instructive.
Even when privacy notices are received, the evidence suggests they usually fail to provoke any
significant response—positive or negative. Ironically, in the context of privacy notices, it does not
matter whether the notice is asking for a response from the consumer to permit use of personal data or
to block such use; neither prompts consumers to respond.
This was clearly demonstrated by a late 2000 test conducted by one of the United States’ ten
largest online service providers. The company randomly selected two groups of its registered online
users and sent to both an email about a change in the company’s policy regarding email notices of
“special offers and events.” To the first group of 94,421 users, the company wrote that they would
receive those communications unless they opted out within 14 days. To the second group of 88,787
users, the company wrote that users who wished to receive notices of “special offers and events” from
the company would need to opt in within 14 days. Both emails included the same links to the
notification preferences section of the user profile, information on how to access that section in the
future, and links to the company’s user agreement and privacy policy. The response rates were
virtually identical: 4.41 percent responded to the first (optout) email; 4.55 percent responded to the
second (optin) email.59 The fact that the optin and optout rates were virtually the same suggests that
the figures reflect little if anything about privacy preferences, but a great deal about the difficulty of
getting consumers to respond to any request.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that security breach notices are provoking precisely the same
lack of reaction. Many organizations that have sent notices report that they rarely receive any response
from consumers, especially as breach notices have become more common. Offers of credit monitoring
or other tools to help guard against harm that might be caused by the breach are rarely taken advantage
of by more than 5 percent of recipients. To the extent notices are being relied upon to inform and
motivate consumer behavior, five years of experience with them in the United States suggests they are
failing to do so. Thus, if harm is threatened by a security breach, notices are not working to cause
consumers to take the steps available to them to protect themselves—a key goal of breach notices
identified in all the consultation guides to date.
The lack of individual response may reflect a calculation that either the breach poses no
reasonable risk of harm to the recipient of the notice or that there is nothing the individual can do to
protect himself or herself. If that calculation is inaccurate, then it reflects a failing of the notice
process: the notice has not been received or it has not been sufficiently informative or persuasive to
motivate the desired behavior. But there is growing evidence, as already discussed, that the calculation
often is accurate—that no real harm is threatened by the breach or that if there is harm, there is little
the individual can to mitigate it—which makes the use of the notice inappropriate.
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Defining the terms under which notice is appropriate, and those in which it is not, is a major
focus of the United Kingdom, Canadian, New Zealand, and Australian guides. For example, the
Canadian document notes that “the challenge is to determine when notices should be required … on a
casebycase basis.”60 According to the guide, “the key consideration in deciding whether to notify
affected individuals should be whether notification is necessary in order to avoid or mitigate harm to
an individual … tak[ing] into account the ability of individuals to take specific steps to mitigate any
such harm.”61
This is a critical and necessary inquiry if notices are to have their intended impact. And while
it is consistently stressed in the United Kingdom, Canadian, New Zealand, and Australian guides, it is
ignored in the United States, at least at the state level, where most states require notification
irrespective of risk of harm and of whether there is anything the recipient can do to mitigate harm.
Some federal policymakers in the United States, by contrast, have shown greater concern for targeting
notices to those situations in which they might make a meaningful difference.
What is more surprising are the current proposals in the European Union for the expansive use
of notices, even where there is no risk of harm or nothing the individual can to do guard against that
harm. The current draft of the EU ePrivacy directive would require mandatory notification of both
national regulatory authorities and individual customers of “a breach of security leading to the
accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of or access to personal
data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed in connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services.”62 Even the accidental destruction of data, where there is no risk
posed of any harm whatever, would require mandatory notification. The European Data Protection
Supervisor and the Article 29 Working Party of European data protection commissioners have
recommended expanding this provision still further to apply to all “information society services.”63
Requiring breach notices in situations other than those in which they are realistically likely to
prevent or mitigate harm or serve some other clearly articulated valuable function threatens to
exacerbate the existing tendency of recipients to ignore those notices. Like the boy in the fairy tale
who cried “wolf” too many times when no wolf was present, thereby causing the villagers to ignore
his cries when a wolf really did threaten their home, regulators run the risk of teaching individuals to
ignore notices by using them inappropriately.
Similarly, the inappropriate use of notices seems likely to misfocus the public on security
breaches, when the evidence suggests that individuals face more serious threats that there actually are
practical steps they can take to guard themselves against. For example, identity fraud is often
perpetrated by people the victim knows. Of the onequarter to onethird of victims of identity fraud
surveyed in the Synovate and Javelin studies who knew who had taken their personal information,
more than half of the perpetrators every year was a friend, family member, neighbor, inhome worker,
or coworker.64 In fact, according to the 42 to 54 percent of victims in those studies who knew how

13

their personal information was obtained, between 29 and 38 percent report each year that it was a lost
or stolen wallet or purse.65 So while regulators are requiring that consumers be notified of security
breaches—the least common way to date that information used for identity fraud is obtained—those
notices may be unintentionally causing individuals to ignore the practical steps that they—and only
they—can take to protect themselves against far more common threats closer to home.

c. Industry Incentives
Empowering individuals to protect themselves is not the only justification for breach
notification laws. Proponents also point to the incentives that notices can create for better security
through public embarrassment, legal liability, and regulatory pressure. These are potentially powerful
incentives, but using notices as a way of achieving them is not without risks, especially if notices are
required for all breaches indiscriminately.
Most security experts recognize that some unauthorized access to data is inevitable, no matter
how great the investment in securing the data. This inevitability is of course much broader when
applied not only to the theft of sensitive data, but also to the theft or loss of equipment and media that
contain such data. If data processors suffer the same financial and reputational penalties for
negligently permitting personal data to be accessed by an unauthorized third party, as opposed to being
incidentally involved in the loss or theft of some of the media on which they are stored, it is not clear
that they will be motivated to invest in better security for personal data, as opposed to investing in
insurance, attorneys, and public relations staff to deal with the inevitable loss. In other words, if this
incentive operates irrespective of the institution’s investment in good security, past security success, or
the harm posed by the breach, then the incentive is not likely to prove effective in motivating the
desired behavior. In fact, the U.S. experience suggests that one major incentive of breach notification
laws for organizations suffering security breaches is not to report. According to one 2008 survey, only
11 percent of security breaches are actually reported.66
Another risk posed by notice requirements is that the incentive effect is shortlived.
Considerable attention has been focused on the fact that organizations suffering security breaches paid
a high price in terms of their stock price and market value. One 2003 study showed that firms
victimized by an information security compromise that involved theft of credit card information
suffered a stock market loss of 9.3 percent on the day the incident was announced, increasing to 14.9
percent over three days67—three to five times the amount found in similar studies for other classes of
events.”68 But as breaches have become more common, that effect has not only diminished, but also
proved shortlived. The same is true of the risk of customer defections. Customers may claim in
surveys that they would consider moving to a competitor because of a breach, but as more and more of
those competitors have suffered breaches themselves, the incentive to move has declined. It is ironic
that the same notices that first alerted the public and the press to the problem of security breaches,
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have contributed to desensitizing them to those breaches and reducing the longterm effect of those
breaches.
It is also important to remember that at least in the United States, organizations already have
significant incentives to avoid security breaches that contribute to identity fraud or other financial
injuries because businesses already bear the lion’s share—some studies estimate 90 percent—of the
losses resulting from those criminal acts.69 Notification requirements thus burden the institutional
victims of security breaches with the additional costs associated with providing notice even though the
likelihood of an individual recipient being harmed as a result of the breach, or taking action to reduce
that likelihood in response to a notice, is very low.
Finally, as is the case with individuals, if avoiding having to send notices becomes the major
focus of industry security efforts, that preoccupation is likely to divert scarce resources away from
dealing with other security threats. To the extent that laws require the use of notices even when the
breach threatens no harm, it seems likely that the notice requirements will result in those resources
being poorly invested.
These important lessons have been lost on many U.S. policymakers, especially at the state
level, who have almost universally opted for requiring notices even for breaches that threaten no harm
and for a strict liability approach that applies the same penalties—in this case, primarily public
embarrassment—irrespective of the measures taken by the data processor or the breadth of the term
security “breach.” The result is plain to see: consumers are rapidly learning to ignore breach notices;
they are losing the ability to distinguish in the market between responsible organizations with good
security that happen to suffer one inevitable breach and irresponsible organizations with poor security
that suffer an easily preventable breach. Consumers and businesses alike are having the attention and
other resources that they invest in security focused on less serious threats, at the cost of failing to
address more serious threats.
To the extent notices are intended to motivate “individuals to take steps to protect themselves
from any harmful effects” of the breach,70 the U.S. experience suggests that not only do they often not
work, but they impose other, unintended costs as well. To the extent breach notices are designed to
increase “accountability” of organizations that suffer breaches, raise “awareness among the public,”71
and alert “appropriate regulatory bodies,”72 there would appear to be more effective and efficient
methods: such as requiring reporting of breaches to an agency or on a breach website (New
Hampshire, for example, now maintains a public website of notices of breaches affecting New
Hampshire residents73). Better designed reporting obligations might lead to greater reporting of
security breaches.
Put simply, if we think real risks are posed by security breaches, the notice response is too
timid. If not, the notice response is too great.
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5. TwentiethCentury Responses to TwentyfirstCentury Information
Flows and Challenges
The most significant issue raised by information security breach notification laws is that they
ignore the broader context in which personal data are collected, used, and transferred today, and
invoke a twentiethcentury response to address the twentyfirstcentury reality of ubiquitous, global
flows of digital data and critical security threats.

a. Ubiquitous Digital Data
Notices to individuals when personal data are potentially compromised—like privacy notices
when personal data are collected, shared, or otherwise processed—were designed for a world in which
data processing was infrequent, highly centralized, and clearly structured. A business might acquire a
data set in a single transaction, store it on a mainframe computer, and use it only for identified
purposes. Access to the data set without authorization was comparatively difficult to accomplish, easy
to guard against, and capable of being identified with certainty. Notices were of questionable value in
the management of data in even this antiquated environment, for many of the reasons already
identified, but they were a familiar part of the dominant paradigm of fair information practice
principles and imposed only modest burdens on individuals and enterprises.
Today, the collection and use of personal data are ubiquitous. As Stanford Law School
professor and former dean Kathleen Sullivan has written, “[t]oday, our biographies are etched in the
ones and zeros we leave behind in daily digital transactions.”74 Increasingly, everything individuals do,
every step they take, every transaction they enter into is memorialized in digital data, and those data
are routinely collected and stored by, and shared with, multiple third parties:
•

What individuals buy and the other transactions in which they engage—30 billion checks, 26
billion debit card transactions, 22 billion credit card transactions annually.75

•

What individuals communicate with family, friends, and colleagues in more than 30 billion
emails a day.76 The United States alone accounts for about 1.6 billion text messages a day.77
These are all captured digitally, together with voicemail and Voice Over IP conversations, by
someone other than, or in addition to, the sender.

•

Location information. There are 2.7 billion mobile phones worldwide, 78 which 95 percent of
users say they keep within three feet of themselves at all times. 79 Mobile phones thus
constitute the world’s largest sensor network. Through GPS and triangulation, these phones
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generate increasingly precise information about the location, speed, and direction of
movement of the user. Many cars contain navigational systems that include a GPS receiver.
Laptops, PDAs, and cell phones that connect to WiFi necessarily provide information
concerning the user’s location. Electronic toll payment systems provide a stream of location
data to anyone with an appropriate reader.
•

What individuals watch, listen to, and read through digital satellite and cable, iTunes,
Amazon, and hundreds of other entertainment service providers and vendors.

•

What individuals are doing in the office, in public, and increasingly even at home with video
and audio surveillance, keycards, security systems, keystroke monitoring, stored email and
voicemail, and remote access to networked files.

•

What individuals are interested in, looking for, or concerned about. Internet users generate a
reported 113 billion searches a year worldwide, doubling every two years.80 The New York
Times calculated that Yahoo!, Google, Microsoft, AOL, and MySpace record at least 336
billion transmission events per month, not counting their ad networks. Yahoo! alone collects
data on each user an average of 811 times per month from its own sites, or 2,520 times per
month if its partner sites on which Yahoo! provides ads are included. 81 Marc Rotenberg,
executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, has commented, “[w]e’re
recording preferences, hopes, worries and fears.”82

•

Data on individuals and their families, friends, and coworkers through social networking
(MySpace and Facebook get a reported 100 billion page views per month83), blogs, photo and
video sharing (e.g., YouTube, Flickr), peertopeer filesharing, virtual worlds, and even
remote storage of documents and financial information—what is often called “cloud
computing.”

Individuals increasingly live their lives awash in what the London Daily Mail has called a
“bottomless ocean of information.”84
At the same time, demand for personal data from business, the government, and other
organizations is escalating. Access to personal data facilitates increasingly targeted products, services,
and advertising. It makes possible greater user convenience, efficiency, and recognition. Personal
information is regarded as increasingly essential to security and accountability.
In the face of this escalating demand for personal information, and for the technologies,
products, and services that both rely on and provide an everincreasing supply of personal data, the
collection, storage, and sharing of those data are increasingly routine and even automatic. In many
settings, data subjects have no choice because of government requirements or because the service or
product cannot be provided without the data.
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The vast majority of these data are held by third parties, while they may be invisible or
inaccessible to individuals (e.g., individuals may not know where they are by looking at their cell
phones, but the cellular service providers do). In fact they are often processed by numerous third
parties. Consider a credit card or debit card transaction, which involves data passing through the hands
of the merchant or bank at which the card is presented, the payment network, the card issuer, the
clearing bank, all of the intervening communications providers (including ISPs or telephone
companies for remote transactions), and companies that provide services to all of these entities.
And these data today are digital, which makes them easier and far less expensive to collect,
store, share, search, and interconnect. Thus, even innocuous data or nonpersonally identifiable data,
when combined with dozens of other data elements, may become very revealing.
In this dataintensive, complex, and, as discussed in greater detail below, global world, breach
notices—like privacy notices—are increasingly outdated. If individuals must be notified every time
personal data are collected or used, the public and the environment will succumb under the deluge of
those notices. Alternatively, notices will become so broad and generic, that they will offer no
protection. In either case, they will be uniformly ignored by individuals. This is especially true for
breach notices. Notices are too slow, too cumbersome, and too poorly timed to provide meaningful
protection for information security, and requiring them as a broad response to security threats
promises to inundate individuals with notices that they are illequipped and unlikely to act on. The
U.S. experience with notices indicates that this is already the case.

b. Global Data Flows
The mounting interest in mandatory security breach notices must also be evaluated in light of
the increasingly global nature of commerce and information flows. The internet connects more than
200 countries. It makes data not only interconnected, but increasingly interoperable. As a result, it has
become the backbone for some of our most important networks—for example, ATM transactions and
air traffic control data. The internet is used every day by individuals and enterprises alike, and has
facilitated dramatic growth in multinational commerce and in outsourcing, which takes advantage of
reliable, affordable information technologies to provide a wide range of services—from backoffice
processing to customer call centers. National security and other shared concerns have also spurred
greater sharing of data across borders.
The value of notices is further decreased when they involve unaccountedfor data in other
countries that the individual recipient is even lessequipped to understand, evaluate, or take action
concerning. Moreover, the wide variety of notice regimes being used or considered by different
nations—or in the United States, by different states—highlights the incongruity between national (or
provincial) requirements and global data flows. As European Data Protection Supervisor Peter Hustinx

18

noted in 2007, “[t]he economy depends more and more on global networks. … In general, the physical
place of a processing operation is less relevant.”85
The proliferation of digital data and the expansion of global commerce and data flows
challenge the old ways of thinking about privacy. Linking privacy and security protection to notice is
increasingly unworkable. As United Kingdom Information Commissioner Richard Thomas stressed in
July 2008:
We want to generate new thinking. European data protection law is
increasingly seen as outofdate, bureaucratic and excessively prescriptive. It is
showing its age and is failing to meet new challenges to privacy, such as the transfer
of personal details across international borders and the huge growth in personal
information online. It is high time the law is reviewed and updated for the modern
world.86
The need for new thinking exists not only in Europe, but also in the United States and other
nations, and it applies not only to data protection law, but to information security as well.

c. Information Security Threats
The need for innovative thinking about how to protect data is especially acute in the face of a
rapidly expanding array of critical information security threats—threats that are growing in frequency,
variety, sophistication, and maliciousness. According to security software firm Symantec,
technological attacks are “no longer carried out by hackers and script kiddies; it’s gangs of criminals
who are well funded and well organized.”87 A number of recent frauds reflect key similarities—e.g.,
common addresses, phone numbers, targets, and strategies—that cause law enforcement officials to
believe they are orchestrated by wellorganized and financed perpetrators.
These sophisticated fraud rings are highly specialized and operate across national borders.
During the summer of 2008, U.S. authorities indicted 11 people from five countries for stealing 40
million debit and credit card numbers from at least nine major retail corporations. According to the
U.S. Attorney General, the thieves “used sophisticated computer hacking techniques, breaching
security systems and installing programs that gathered enormous quantities of personal financial data,”
which they then exploited through a variety of fraud networks.88
The variety and complexity of technological tools used by information thieves are astounding:
rootkits that take control of individual systems; botnets that connect compromised machines to work in
tandem stealing data or attacking servers; wireless communication interception and diversion; domain
name server attacks that divert unwitting users to fraudulent websites and steal online information; and
dozens of other measures.
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Spyware is a broad and particularly vexing category of malicious software. Downloaded along
with innocent programs or attached to email, spyware collects sensitive personal information, directly
from users’ computers. Billions of dollars are spent each year on antispyware software and updates.
Microsoft reported that 50 percent of Windows XP operating system crashes were due to spyware.
Dell and McAfee report that spyware accounts for 10–12 percent of all tech support calls.89 Spyware
has now expanded into crimeware, terrorware, vandalware, and ransomware—all of which acutely
threaten both individual and institutional information.
Many of the most rapidly growing and most successful attacks today involve social
engineering—devious means of persuading individuals to part with their own data. This is often the
case with spyware, which individuals are induced to download with promises of free software or
pornography or breaking news stories. “Phishing” is another prominent way in which unsuspecting
users are deceived—in this case, through an email message purporting to come from a friend,
colleague, or respectable business or other organization—into providing personal data to a fraudulent
website that impersonates a legitimate one. Phishing attacks are growing rapidly in both frequency and
effectiveness. “Spear phishing,” which relies on contextual information to target fraudulent messages
based on characteristics of specific internet users, is proving even more effective. In one Indiana
University study, the percentage of recipients of a phishing message persuaded to provide their
account name and password increased from 16 percent to 72 percent when the researchers made it
appear that the fraudulent message originated from a Facebook friend. 90
Seven in ten U.S. internet users say they have been fooled by phishing messages, and a 2007
survey showed that the same percentage of Australians engaged in online behavior that put them “at
risk” of falling victim to phishing.91 According to Gartner, “phishing attacks in the United States
soared in 2007 as $3.2 billion was lost to these attacks.”92 As evidence of the increasing specialization
and mass availability of malicious software, consider that 42 percent of phishing websites observed in
the first half of 2007 originated from just three phishing toolkits.93
New technologies bring with them new attacks. Cell phones, which often store extensive
personal data and contain links to email accounts and servers that house even more, have been the
most recent battlefield. The move toward greater handset compatibility increases the vulnerability. As
the SANS Institute reported in 2008, “[a] truly open mobile platform will usher in completely
unforeseen security nightmares.”94
Unlike earlier viruses and worms, which were designed largely to highlight their youthful
creators’ prowess, these attacks are used to steal data, deny service, and extort payments from affected
institutions. According to the SANS Institute, cybercriminals used technological attacks to extort
“hundreds of millions of dollars from multiple critical infrastructure companies” in 2006 and 2007.95
In January 2008, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency issued a rare public warning that attackers had
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broken into the computer networks of utility companies and then made demands, in at least one case
causing a power outage affecting “multiple cities.”96
The magnitude of cyberthreats has grown even further to include online terrorism and
militarylike attacks against both government and private sector systems and data. U.S. government
agencies reported 12,986 cyber security incidents to the U.S. Homeland Security Department in 2007,
triple the number from two years earlier.97 In 2005, the last year for which complete data are available,
the Pentagon reported more than 79,000 attempted intrusions into its computer networks, about 13,300
of which were successful.98 In response, the U.S. Department of Defense has created a new Cyber
Warfare Command. German and British government officials report similar attacks, many believed to
have originated with a Chinese army unit, against their official and industry networks. 99
Russian fundamentalists crippled the Baltic state of Estonia by launching attacks against
government, banking, and communications networks, and the Russian incursion into Georgia was
preceded by cyber assaults on critical public and private networks.100 “Cyberwarfare is not becoming
the threat of the future, it already is,” said Estonian Defense Minister Jack Aaviksoo. 101 In April 2008,
BusinessWeek warned in a special report that phishing has become the “New ESpionage Threat.”102
Email messages are being sent to U.S. defense contractors and other major corporations that secretly
install key logging software on the users’ computers to “suck sensitive data” from corporate networks
and report it back to a Chinese website.
The cost of cyber attacks in the United States alone was estimated in a 2007 congressional
report to be $400 million a year, not counting the invasion of individuals’ privacy.103
In the face of such aggressive, escalating, sophisticated, and costly information security
attacks, breach notices seem a paltry response. With data being stolen on such a massive scale and
seven out of ten individuals reporting that they are unintentionally supplying their own personal data
to thieves, requiring a notice every time an institution suffers a breach, especially if the “breach” is a
lost laptop or backup data, is ludicrous. The shortcomings of breach notices—in particular, their
failure to prevent, rather than merely provide notice of, attacks—are intensified, and the true cost of
their potential for distracting individuals and institutions from the steps they can take to thwart far
more serious attacks is starkly illuminated. Perhaps most importantly, the range and severity of
information security threats powerfully illustrate the urgency of the need for new and imaginative
approaches to information security. While breach notices may be a familiar tool, they are illsuited as a
broad response to the realities of the global flows of digital information or of the sustained threats to
that information in the twentyfirst century.
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Conclusion
The recent guides to breach notices from the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and
Australia in many ways reflect the limits of notices and the challenges of protecting privacy and
security. They provide frameworks under which notice to specific individuals would be only a small
part of a broader approach to information security, and even then used only when a breach threatens
actual harm to individuals and there is something those individuals can do to mitigate that harm. Those
documents also recognize the risks of “over notifying.”104
The EU and U.S. approaches to breach notices seem less sensitive to the limited role that
breach notices can play or to the risks of requiring them inappropriately. Those risks are numerous.
The EU and U.S. approaches rely on a tool that in most situations contributes little to the security of
personal information; that requires individuals to take steps that they are unlikely to take and that may
be unavailable to them in any event; that responds to breaches rather than prevents them; and that is of
diminishing utility over time. By defining breaches too broadly, they require notices even when no
data have been compromised and no harm is threatened, and create perverse incentives for institutions
to invest in preventing breaches, and managing customer relations and public relations spin when that
impossible goal is not obtained, rather than focusing scare resources on greater security threats. They
diminish the value of notices when they might otherwise be appropriate.
But the greatest risk of the focus on security breach notices, magnified in the EU and U.S.
approaches, is that it applies a twentiethcentury tool to twentyfirstcentury issues, when what is
desperately needed is far more forwardlooking, imaginative thinking about how to protect security
and privacy from far more serious dangers in a world of ubiquitous data and global information flows.
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